The Intersection of Linguistics, Social Construction, and Identity
A Piece on the Intricate Connections between Gender Identity Labels and Concepts in Linguistics and Social Constructionism, and Cultivating a Socially Inclusive Approach to Identity
(Disclaimer: This was essentially written willy-nilly — meaning I did not do any supplementary reading in preparation. All concepts discussed in this article are merely based on already-attained knowledge from books, articles, and other literature read before I even thought to compose this article. Consequently, there will be no quotes or citations of any sort [except for one source on pre-colonial Philippine history]— it is, in large part, just words upon words of incessant waffling wherein the word ‘thus’ is repeated a bit too often. Thus, I recommend that this piece be read especially critically like one would any other literature.)
There are no truly inherent, objective meanings to words, phrases, or sentences at all — the prescriptive definition of ‘cross’ is not engraved onto the site of Jesus’ crucifixion, nor do loaves of bread explain why exactly they are now called ‘loaves of bread’ as soon as they have completed the baking process. If these were true, you could then argue that there is at least some significant semblance of objectivity to the meanings of language, but that is (unfortunately) not the world we live in.
In actuality, my comprehension of, say, the term ‘chair’ could very easily be different from your comprehension of the term ‘chair’, yet one thing that remains true is this: through this, we display a similarity, in that we use ‘chair’ to describe or refer to a certain thing — a concept, an object, or whatever it be. In other, more conclusive words, we use this language — ‘chair’ — to convey meaning found in reality.
Thus, we can then further conclude that the origin of meaning is not the language by which we convey it. It is merely that language is what we utilize to convey meaning, and that this conception of ‘meaning’ already presupposes the existence and utilization of language. Put simply, meaning is already there to begin with, we only use language to signify it.
So then, one may ask, if language is so subjective, if language truly has no inherent meaning at all, then why does this so-called subjective definition of ‘chair’ almost always align accordingly (and alliteratively) with other people’s definitions of ‘chair’?
The answer to this question simply lies in the not-so-simple sociological theory of social construction:
Humans are not only a species existing in a natural, physical world — where man may interact with and manipulate his tangible environment, including both non-living objects and corporeal, living organisms. Humanity also exists in the social world — where man interacts with others not on a physical level, but, obviously, on a social one. These two worlds are, however, inextricably intertwined with one another. The reality of the physical world is apprehended by man collectively, which then results in not individual but joint comprehensions of reality — comprehensions that are only firmly held together by the very fact that they are joint, as circular as it may sound.
To expound, let us return to our example of the definition of ‘chair’ with a painfully inaccurate hypothetical regarding its genesis: suppose that an inventor invents this inventional invention: what he calls the ‘houngry’, which appears to be a seat that has a back and four legs. No one yet knows of the existence of this revolutionary creation as it has only just been invented, nor does anyone know of its prescriptive name as given to it by its inventor, ‘houngry’.
Now, suppose that the ‘houngry’ begins its widespread public usage as a sitting apparatus. The inventor is overjoyed at this fact, extremely so, but there is a catch — people are calling it ‘chair’. Not ‘houngry’, but chair. (butt chair)
One man, perhaps the very first user of this sitting apparatus, referred to it as a ‘chair’ because he made an atrocious error of the tongue — he managed to pronounce ‘houngry’ as ‘chair’. However, this term somehow caught on. In fact, the term has caught on so strongly that everyone who has referred to this sitting apparatus has only used the word ‘chair’, and never ‘houngry’. Thus, it then became collectively understood that this sitting apparatus, despite being prescriptively titled ‘houngry’ by its own inventor, is known as the ‘chair’ by the general population.
There is, however, another thing to note: there are already other sitting apparatuses existent in this world — those whose inventions precede that of the houngry chair. Benches, couches, toilets, even stairs, you name it. Some people have different internalized comprehensions of the meaning of ‘chair’ as a consequence of the natural similarity between it and other sitting apparatuses, which then results in some of these other miscellaneous sitting apparatuses being described as ‘chair’ by some, and not as ‘chair’ by others. Essentially, this is where the conflict of subjective meanings comes into play.
It may sound comedic or oversimplified, but this hypothetical effectively demonstrates the point I am attempting to create when I describe language as ‘subjective’, in that it a) is socially constructed, and b) has no truly inherent objective meaning.
The sitting apparatus is only known as ‘chair’ purely by the fact that it is collectively referred to as ‘chair’. Furthermore, it is not known as ‘houngry’ despite the fact that the inventor prescriptively provided to it that title. The concept of this sitting apparatus being called the ‘houngry’ is effectively faulty due to the fact that it is merely one person, namely its inventor, that knows it and refers to it by that name.
Conclusively, the term ‘chair’ has now had assigned to it a vague socially constructed meaning — that it generally pertains to a sitting apparatus that typically has four legs and a back, one that exists in the natural, physical world. This is to say that the existing object — the sitting apparatus itself — is the meaning that is conveyed through the language that is ‘chair’. This definition, however, may vary from person to person, which is a concept soon to be elucidated.
Thus, these propositions may be established so far:
- Language is not the origin of meaning, it is merely used to convey meanings comprehended from reality. In other words, meaning is entirely different from the language utilized to convey it.
- This ‘meaning’ is based on socially constructed assumptions regarding reality.
- (Corollary of Proposition 2) Because meaning uses socially constructed conceptions of reality, it therefore has the capacity to be subjective.
Now, suppose that society has progressed for about a millennium, and the sitting apparatus known as the ‘chair’ has evolved drastically — perhaps it now has 6 legs instead of 4. Likewise, the general definition of the term utilized to refer to it has evolved as well — instead of mostly referring to sitting apparatuses with 4 legs and a back, it now typically refers to sitting apparatuses with 6 legs and a back.
Furthermore, the ‘chair’ may have been spread vastly and integrated into societies other than the primordial one from which it originates. Consequently, these other societies caused and experienced their own evolution processes of the ‘chair’, which led to their societies’ definition of ‘chair’ becoming distinct from the society in which it was initially invented. Perhaps, in another society, it now generally refers to a 3-legged sitting apparatus that somehow has two backs, in a pathetically hilarious Lovecraftian sense. It is still referred to as ‘chair’, yet the object itself that is the ‘chair’ is now entirely detached from the ‘chair’ of the original society.
Concomitantly, the term ‘chair’ now becomes a polyseme, for it is now a word with multiple, significantly distinguishable meanings. To recall, this is a result of the separate, simultaneous processes of social construction that occurred — and continue to occur in so far as humanity remains a social species — within the different societies of this hypothetical world.
Thus, these propositions may be established:
4. (Corollary of Proposition 3) Not only is meaning e.g. the definitions of words and phrases subjective in the sense that they may differ between singular individuals, but that they may also differ between distinct cultured groups of people, including entire societies.
5. Language naturally evolves in accordance with man’s apprehension of reality, therefore language has the capacity to be fluid.
Finally, assume that another substantial amount of time — perhaps half a millennium — has passed in the houngry universe. There is one notable difference — there now exists a new sitting apparatus, one that is not necessarily the ‘chair’. This is not a fresh inventional invention invented by an inventor, however. In fact, it is actually just the culmination of decades upon decades of houngry chair evolution. This brand new, contemporary sitting apparatus — almost no one would be able to deduce that its original form is the archaic houngry chair from 1,500 years ago. It is no longer the ‘chair’, no, it is something new. It is avant-garde, it is the Cubist-Dadaist-Conceptual-Futurist of the sitting apparatuses, the ultimate epitome of postmodernist sitting culture. No longer can it be described as the ‘chair’.
Consequently, the perpetual process of social construction has given it a new name: the ‘penis’. This can simply be explained by the fact that the people engaged with this new sitting apparatus (in the sense that they interact with it in any sense of the word) are no longer capable of recognizing it as ‘chair’, therefore they have naturally inclined to ascribe to it a new term — one that is not ‘houngry’ or ‘chair’.
Thus, in the simultaneous and ongoing processes of social construction and evolution, both a new sitting apparatus and a new term to refer to this sitting apparatus have been created.
(Note that in the real-life process of social construction, this conception of new terms may either occur intentionally or unintentionally, but that is irrelevant to the point I am attempting to make, so I believe that it is best to leave that condition ambiguous.)
At last, an expansion of the fifth proposition may be established:
5. Language naturally evolves in accordance with man’s apprehension of reality, therefore language has the capacity to be fluid. This quality of fluidity includes the capacity to experience the addition of new, unprecedented aspects to man’s apprehension of reality.
Now that all 5 propositions have been fully established and elucidated after an embarrassingly lengthy waffle, then enters the main topic of interest: gender identity and its associated language.
(Disclaimer 2: In the following section, I will mostly be using the modern-day terms utilized in regards to gender as opposed to the historical terms, for convenience’s sake. For instance, if I say ‘bisexual’ I do not mean it in the old-fashioned sense of identifying with ‘a bit of both genders’, rather, I refer to the sexuality that generally conveys attraction to two or more genders/sexes. This remains true even if I am speaking of a historical period in which the term meant the former and not the latter. What I mean to say is, you must approach, analyze, and engage with this section under a present-day mindset.)
In Western history, at the very least, the concept of what we now call ‘gender identity’ in a human context has mostly been on the basis of an individual’s assigned sex at birth. Someone born with a penis and testicles i.e. a male (in the sense of biological sex) was designated as a man, while someone born with a vagina i.e. a female was designated as a woman. Of course, confusions expectedly arose in the cases of intersex people, and there also was the eventual discovery of sex chromosomes, sex hormones, and other determiners of biological sex, but that was essentially the gist of it.
Thus, gender, in that era and society, may generally be defined as ‘one’s biological sex, namely sexual reproductive organs, sex chromosomes, hormones, etc.’
The societies whose definitions of gender fell in accordance with this, however, approached a point of conflict upon the discovery and manifestation of gender incongruence — that an individual’s gender may not necessarily be entirely aligned with their birth sex. Worthy to note is the fact that this was not simply a choice for most people — gender incongruence is typically a natural feeling that only exists as a result of how ‘gender’ is socially defined. On that account, the definition of gender that uses biological sex as its basis is then found to be inherently problematic in that it does not align with humanity’s apprehension of their own reality — namely what they perceive to be their ‘gender’.
In this case, evolution becomes necessitated in regards to the definition of ‘gender’. It shall not be one on the basis of biological sex for that has already been proven to be inherently troublesome for those with gender incongruence, but one that accommodates this by separating it from biological sex. Thus, gender identity as we know it today is merely known as the perception of one’s own gender, which has the capacity to either correlate with one’s assigned sex at birth or not.
With this, the fifth proposition comes into play: that “[l]anguage naturally evolves in accordance with man’s apprehension of reality, therefore language has the capacity to be fluid. This quality of fluidity is inclusive of the capacity to experience the addition of new, unprecedented aspects to man’s apprehension of reality.”
The manifestation of gender incongruence — a new, unprecedented aspect of humanity’s apprehension of gender — necessitated a change in the language and meaning of gender. As the meaning that we convey using language changes, language itself concomitantly changes as well.
(Of course, it is worthy of note that this is quite an oversimplification of how transgender people came to be. The history of the evolution of transgender communities is much more complex than the vague outline I have created here. I am merely analyzing and reviewing the drastic disparities between the Western conception of gender in much more immemorial history — before the concept of ‘transgender’ or the more antiquated ‘transsexual’ could even be thought of — as compared to the more progressive, contemporary conception of gender in the modern era.)
There is but one more modern-day application of the fifth proposition, however, which will also be accompanied by a ludicrous misunderstanding of queer history. (For credibility reasons, this self-deprecation is merely done in jest)
As society evolved and gender identity with it, the manifestation of gender incongruence was not only characterized by gender identities of binary nature. In fact, a new type of gender identity has arisen as a result of this evolution: the general category of ‘non-binary’.
The concept of non-binary gender identity is an incredibly loaded topic by virtue of the fact that it, itself, is a vague, loaded umbrella term, but to put it simply, it essentially refers to gender identities that may not necessarily align and correspond entirely with the ‘binary genders’ i.e. man/woman or boy/girl.
From this, it may rightfully be assumed that the designation of the term ‘non-binary gender’ was necessitated by the very evolution of gender identity — the perpetual development that resulted in some people’s subjective perceptions of their own gender not corresponding to either male or female, man or woman, boy or girl. With the ongoing, ever-changing social construction of the meanings of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ essentially came the identities whose meanings were not felt to be sufficiently communicated by those two terms alone. Because one’s assigned sex at birth was no longer the basis upon which gender is determined, then came more breathing room for liberated movement, opportunities for the fluidity of identity. Very much like the contemporary, avant-garde sitting apparatus created in my previous chair hypothetical, the creation and adoption of a new term to signify its meaning was necessitated.
Once again, the fifth proposition returns into play — with the evolution of gender identity came the manifestation of a new, non-binary category of gender. Thus, an evolution of language to accommodate this change was necessitated as well.
For the next few points, let us take a classic example of gender identity — one that is loved by all (except misogynists, I suppose): women.
As has already been established, there is no truly inherent meaning to words, so why exactly are there people who feel that their identity aligns best with the label ‘woman’, in all its uncertainty? Why is it that people are able to identify with a certain label if labels themselves are, in fact, so fluid?
The answer, once again, simply lies in the not-so-simple theory of social construction: the meaning of this gender identity is both created and upheld by humanity’s joint comprehension of it. As circular as it may sound, some people feel that they identify best with ‘woman’ because it is the societal perception of what ‘woman’ is that they feel aligns best with their personal perception of their own identity. Thus, the meaning of ‘woman’ is neither objective nor monolithic. Put differently, ‘it is what it is’.
Furthermore, to echo a statement repeated a myriad times — as society evolves, gender identity evolves with it. With the evolution of society comes the evolution of society’s socially constructed assumptions of reality, which includes the social construct of gender identity itself. Thus, what people have collectively referred to and understood as ‘woman’ in history no longer holds true in the modern day. In other words, the way people perceive gender has evolved as a natural result of the more general evolution of society — this fact is true for the gender identity of ‘woman’, and it remains true for gender identity itself as well. It is like in the previous chair hypothetical in this article — what was once known as ‘chair’ in the past no longer holds true a millennium later.
With this, the second proposition comes into play: that “[t]his ‘meaning’ is based on socially constructed assumptions regarding reality.”
In addition, the term ‘woman’ is not the origin of gender identity itself. In reality, the identity label of ‘woman’ is merely used as a signification of one’s subjective perception of one’s own gender. This fact remains true for all other identity labels — especially those in regard to gender. When one says, “I am a woman,” ‘woman’ is the label with which they signify their gender identity. Conclusively, the meaning of this label does not originate from the label itself — there is no Paramount Woman Overlord (there is Ariana Grande) that dictates the definition of ‘woman’. Rather, the label of ‘woman’ is exactly just that: a label. It is but an entirely separate albeit strongly connected entity to the gender identity it is intended to convey.
With this, the first proposition comes into play: that “[l]anguage is not the origin of meaning, it is merely used to convey meanings comprehended from reality. In other words, meaning is entirely different from the language utilized to convey it.”
Now, let us travel back to the ancient Philippines, long before its unfortunate subordination to Spain in 1521.
In this era of Philippine history, the culture — or in terms more appropriate to the topic of interest, the socially constructed perception — of gender was largely similar to the one described in historical Western societies. Males were males, females were females, each had their own social roles and expectations, so on and so forth.
There was one notable difference with certain communities, though — it was possible (and tremendously accepted) for those born male to effectively ‘switch genders’ and adopt females’ social roles and expectations. To provide context, these communities in the pre-colonial Philippines were very gender-oriented societies, like most ancient societies were. There were the female ‘babaylans’ who would typically be assigned and expected to perform spiritual tasks, such as those of priests or shamans. Additionally, people of effeminate nature i.e. those who would typically adopt the role of babaylan were handled gently during raids.
The thing is, those born male were able to be assigned the role of babaylan and essentially be what we would call in the modern-day a ‘trans woman’. These people would be often referred to as ‘bayoguin’ among many other terms, and they would have an esteemed status in their respective communities purely by virtue of the fact that those whose biological sex was female were treated the same way. According to J. Neil C. Garcia in the IIAS Newsletter of November 2004, “[t]hey were comparable to women in every way except that they could not bear children. Cronicas tell us they were ‘married’ to men, with whom they had sexual relations.”
Now, to create another hypothetical, suppose that a pre-colonial Philippine society like this coexists but does not necessarily coalesce with a historical Western society that is like the one mentioned in an earlier section — wherein an individual’s gender was determined purely by their biological sex. If a Filipino from the former society attempted to integrate themself into one of the latter types, one may justly assume that some conflicting ideas would be engendered from this — and this very fact would remain true in the vice versa situation.
The Filipino would be at the very least somewhat confused, perhaps in a state of ‘culture shock’, thinking, “there are no bayoguin here?” and other expressions of confusion of the like. Likewise, in the latter situation, the Westerner would be confused (likely even more so) upon discovering the existence of the bayoguin, thinking, “people are capable of transitioning?” and other expressions of the like. (Who knows, this Westerner may even desire to transition themselves upon discovering this!)
Thus, both the third and fourth propositions are fully realized: that “[b]ecause meaning uses socially constructed conceptions of reality, it therefore has the capacity to be subjective,” and that “[n]ot only are the definitions of words or phrases subjective in the sense that they may differ from between singular individuals, but that they may also differ between distinct cultured groups of people, including entire societies.”
Not only is the Filipino’s comprehension of what ‘gender’ is different from the Westerner’s, but the entire community of the Filipino’s comprehension of ‘gender’ is different from the entire society of the Westerner’s.
So then, why exactly does all of this matter? Why, one may ask, did I have to rant for approximately 3,700 words about social constructionism and gender? The answer simply lies in one actually-pretty-simple social phenomenon: the rigid policing of identity.
It much too often can be heard that one is “not a real woman,” or “not a real non-binary person,” or anything else of the like. People base the facts of other people’s identities and apply them to their own perception of it, unaware of the contradiction and conflict of subjective meaning between the two. Then entails the rejection, the ostracization that arises from the naive assumptions that there can only be one true meaning assigned to labels, or that labels are the origin of meaning, or that meanings remain consistent throughout different societies.
It is as a result of this problem that I feel a new sort of approach to identity must be cultivated, one that does not propagate and internalize the falsehoods of the aforementioned assumptions. One that will create a society wherein identity is not prescriptive, nor objective, nor policed, but understood and accepted in every sense of the word. Only under the condition that the 5 propositions listed in this article remain firmly kept in mind may identities and the labels that convey them be truly comprehended.
Being inclusive does not mean being accepting of only one’s own or one’s society’s perception of identity. It means we must account for the natural differences that arise from the differences in culture and their respective social evolutions of identity. It means that we must abandon our tunnel vision and see identity for what it truly is in the big picture.
Identity is, in every sense of the word, subjective — I merely ask that we act like it.
My acknowledgments go out to @inherentvibes on Twitter for naming the second sitting apparatus, namely the ‘penis’, in my hypothetical. Honorable mentions go to @TheoreticalLef1 for suggesting ‘flatland’ which unfortunately lost in the polling, and @cuphaway who had been a bit too late in suggesting ‘Boris’. Unfortunately, I turn out to have been raised in the burbs, but I also express my utmost respect for the streets. My heart goes out to all of you.
